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441CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

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SUBJECT Yugoslav Negotiations with Cominform

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1. At present there are three distinct series of negotiations between the Kremlin and Yugoslavia. These consist of the negotiations in Bucharest between the Cominform and members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, more tentative and deliberate negotiations in Moscow and Belgrade between Soviet and Yugoslav diplomats, and negotiations in Budapest between Rákosi and Pijade's group of Yugoslav Party spokesmen.
2. The recent negotiations in Brăile brought no decisions on ideological matters, due principally to the sensitiveness of the Yugoslav doctrinaires, who resented any interference of Soviet or Satellite theorists of Marxism in Yugoslav internal affairs, and who consider themselves the genuine followers of the Marx-Engels-Lenin system.
3. P. N. Pospelev and N. A. Stashev, on behalf of the Secretariat of the Soviet Communists and the International Bureau, insisted on fundamental agreement on all doctrinal matters as a preliminary condition of the discussion of the return of Yugoslavia to the Cominform. The Cominform representatives are now waiting for instructions on how to deal with the intolerance shown by the Yugoslav delegates in previous meetings.
4. It is expected that the talks will be resumed soon, but no precise date for resumption can be named.
5. In the talks so far held, the influence of Tito himself did not appear to be particularly strong, and it is felt in Moscow that the Yugoslav Communists are looking for a way to get rid of his leadership.

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
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6. The other two lines of conversation are being carried on concurrently. Molotov is insisting that priority be given to a direct approach, through diplomatic channels, but in this area the influence of Tito is very strong, and bargaining is a difficult process. Molotov's plan is to secure a practical agreement with Tito before dealing with ideological questions. In this, Molotov is opposed by Malenkov and Khrushchev, who are in favor of helping the Yugoslav Party doctrinaires to get rid of Tito.
7. Tito, advised by Rankovic, has recently allowed revelations about anti-Communist activity in Yugoslavia, to demonstrate to the Kremlin that in his absence Yugoslavia would not fall into the hands of the Party doctrinaires, but into those of the capitalist opposition.
8. Better results are expected in Moscow from the third line of negotiation, being developed by Rakosi in Budapest on a regional basis. The plan is to involve Yugoslavia in economic links with Hungary and Czechoslovakia before obtaining a Yugoslav break with the West. Successes of importance along this line are expected soon.

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